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Secure and Private Implementation of Dynamic
Controllers Using Semi-Homomorphic Encryption
Carlos Murguia, Farhad Farokhi, and Iman Shames
Abstract—This paper presents a secure and private implemen-
tation of linear time-invariant dynamic controllers using Paillier’s
encryption, a semi-homomorphic encryption method. To avoid
overflow or underflow within the encryption domain, the state
of the controller is reset periodically. A control design approach
is presented to ensure stability and optimize performance of the
closed-loop system with encrypted controller.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) has brought opportunities for flexi-
bility of deployment and efficiency improvements. However, it
threatens security and privacy of individuals and businesses as
IoT devices, by design, share their information for processing
over the cloud. This information can be secured from adver-
saries over the network by using encrypted communication
channels [1]. This approach, although effective and necessary,
does not address vulnerability of the data on servers running
cloud-computing services. These services themselves can use
the data for targeted advertisement or can be hacked for
malicious purposes. Therefore, there is a need for a more
secure methodology that addresses the security and privacy
of data while being processed.
Thankfully secure cloud computing is possible with the use
of homomorphic encryption methods – encryption methods
that allow computation over plain data by performing appro-
priate computations on the encrypted data [2]–[4]. The use of
homomorphic encryption allows a controller to be remotely re-
alised without needing to openly sharing private and sensitive
data (and consenting to its use in an unencrypted manner). This
paper specifically discusses secure and private implementation
of linear time-invariant dynamic controllers with the aid of
the Paillier’s encryption [3], a semi-homomorphic encryption
method.
The use of homomorphic encryption for secure control has
been studied previously [5]–[12]. However, all these studies
consider static controllers. This is because, when dealing with
dynamical control laws (with an encrypted memory/state that
must be maintained remotely), the number of bits required for
representing the state of the controller grows linearly with the
number of iterations. This renders the memory useless after a
few iterations due to an overflow or an underflow (i.e., number
of fractional bits required for representing a number becomes
larger than the number of fractional bits in the fixed-point
number basis). In fact, using rough calculations, it can be seen
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that for a system with sampling time of 10 milliseconds, 16
bits quantized controller parameters and measurements, and
within an encryption space of 2048 bits1, the state of the
controller becomes incorrect after roughly 1.2 seconds due to
an overflow or underflow. The unstabilizing effect of restricting
the memory of controllers to finite rings is illustrated in
Section IV for the key length of 2048 bits using a controller
that can easily stabilize a batch chemical reactor in the absence
of encryption.
There are multiple ways to deal with this issue:
1) We should decrypt the state of the encrypted controller,
project it into the desired set of fixed-point rational
numbers, and encrypt it again. To avoid this issue, the
encrypted state can be sent to a trust third-party (e.g.,
an IoT device) to be decrypted, rounded, encrypted, and
transmitted back. This adds unnecessary communication
overhead and overburdens the computational units of the
IoT device. Furthermore, by decrypting the state, the risk
of a privacy or security breach increases.
2) We should restrict the controller parameters so that
the state of the dynamic controller remains within the
set of fixed-point rational numbers. This approach was
pursued in [13]. This makes the problem of designing
the controller into a mixed-integer optimization problem,
which can be computationally exhaustive. However, a
robust control approach can be taken to ensure that
converting non-integer controllers to integer ones does
not ruin stability [13].
3) We should reset the controller, i.e., the state of the
controller is set to a publicly known number (e.g.,
zero) periodically. In this case, the controller must be
redesigned to ensure stability/performance, which this
paper shows to remain a tractable optimisation problem.
This is the approach chosen by the current paper.
In this paper, we only focus on encrypting the outputs of
the system and the state of the controller. This is because
the parameters of the controller are often not sensitive in
practice. For instance, in autonomous vehicles, the location
and velocity are sensitive as they reveal private information
about the user, e.g., home/work address and travel habits, while
the controller parameters are implicitly related to the dynamics
of the vehicle.
Resetting controllers have been previously studied in [14]–
[20]. However, the synthesis approach in this paper is more
1Encryption keys with the length of 2048 bits is recommended by National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for data over 2016-2030; see
https://www.keylength.com/en/4/.
2general than those studies and further it is designed to ac-
commodate challenges associated with the implementation
of dynamical controllers over the cipher space. Particularly,
majority of existing work on reset controllers focus on state
dependent triggers. Due to the nature of our problem, where
the controller cannot access to the unencrypted state, those
results are not applicable. Along the same lines, since we
always have to reset the controller to the same state regardless
of the state of the plant, the existing results for switched
systems seem to be not applicable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Preliminary
materials on homomorphic encryption are presented in Sec-
tion II. The design and implementation of the controller is dis-
cussed in Section III. Finally, numerical results are presented
in Section IV and the paper is concluded in Section V. All
proofs are presented in the appendices to improve the overall
presentation of the paper.
II. PRELIMINARY MATERIAL
In this paper, a tuple (P,C,K,E,D) denotes a public
key encryption scheme, where P is the set of plaintexts, C
is the set of ciphertexts, K is the set of keys, E is the
encryption algorithm, and D is the decryption algorithm. Each
κ = (κp, κs) ∈ K is composed of a public key κp (which is
shared with and used by everyone for encrypting plaintexts)
and a private key κs (which is maintained only by the trusted
parties for decryption). Algorithms E and D are publicly
known while the keys, which set the parameters of these
algorithms, are generated and used in each case. The use of
the term “algorithm”, instead of mapping or function, is due to
the presence of random2 elements in the encryption procedure
possibly resulting in one plaintext being mapped to multiple ci-
phertexts. A necessary requirement for the encryption scheme
is to be invertible, i.e., D(E(x, κp), κp, κs) = x for all x ∈ P
given κ = (κp, κs) ∈ K.
Definition 1 (Homomorphic Property) Assume there exist
operators ◦ and ⋄ such that (P, ◦) and (C, ⋄) form groups.
A public key encryption (P,C,K,E,D) is called called ho-
momorphic if D(E(x1, κp) ⋄ E(x1, κp), κp, κs) = x1 ◦ x2 for
all x1, x2 ∈ P and κ ∈ K.
Throughout this paper, |A| denotes the cardinality of any
set A. Further, we define the notation Zq := {0, . . . , q− 1} =
{nmod q : ∀n ∈ Z} for all positive integers q ∈ N. In this
paper, we assume that P = Znp and C = Znc with np = |P|
and nc = |C|. A public key encryption (P,C,K,E,D) is
additively homomorphic if there exists an operator ⋄ such
that Definition 1 is satisfied when the operator ◦ is defined
as x1 ◦ x2 := (x1 + x2) mod np for all x1, x2 ∈ P. For
additively homomorphic schemes, in this paper, the notation
⊕ is used to denote the equivalent operator in the ciphertext
domain (⋄ in the definition above). Similarly, a public key
encryption is multiplicatively homomorphic if there exists an
operator ⋄ such that Definition 1 is satisfied with ◦ defined
as x1 ◦ x2 := (x1x2) mod np for all x1, x2 ∈ P. If a
public key encryption is both additively and multiplicatively
2These random elements are replaced with pseudo-random ones when
implementing encryption and decryption algorithms.
homomorphic, it is fully homomorphic but, if only one of
these conditions is satisfied, it is semi-homomorphic. Ho-
momorphism shows there exist operations over ciphertexts
that can generate encrypted versions of sumed or multiplied
plaintexts without the need of decrypting their corresponding
cuphertexts. An example of additively homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme is the Paillier’s encryption method [3]. ElGamal
is an example of multiplicatively homomorphic encryption
schemes [4]. Recently, several fully homomorphic encryption
methods have been also developed, see, e.g., [2].
Now, we define semantic security, borrowed from [21]. A
key κ = (κp, κs) ∈ K is randomly generated. A probabilistic
polynomial time-bounded adversary proposes x1, x2 ∈ P.
The agent chooses x at random from {x1, x2} with equal
probability, encrypts x according to y = E(x, κp), and sends
y to the adversary (along with the public key κp). The
adversary produces x′, which is an estimate of x based on
all the avialable information (everything except κs, i.e., x1,
x2, y, E, D, κp). The adversary’s advantage (in comparison
to that of a pure random number generator) is given by
Adv(|K|) := |P{x = x′} − 1/2|. The public key encryption
(P,C,K,E,D) is semantically secure (alternatively known as
indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack) if Adv is
negligible3.
In this paper, the results are presented for the Paillier’s en-
cryption method. It is noteworthy that the Paillier’s encryption
method is semantically secure under the Decisional Composite
Residuosity Assumption, i.e., it is “hard” to decide whether
there exists y ∈ ZN2 such that x = y
N modN for N ∈ Z
and x ∈ ZN2 . More information regarding the assumption can
be found in [3], [22]. This can be used to establish the security
of the proposed framework.
The Paillier’s encryption scheme is as follows. First the
public and private keys are generated. To do so, large prime
numbers p and q are selected randomly and independently
of each other such that gcd(pq, (1 − p)(1 − q)) = 1, where
gcd(a, b) refers to the greatest common divisor of integers a
and b. The public key (which is shared with all the parties
and is used for encryption) is κp = pq. The private key
(which is only available to the entity that needs to decrypt
the data) is κs = (λ, µ) with λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1)
and µ = λ−1 modκp, where lcm(a, b) is the least common
multiple of integers a and b. The ciphertext of plain message
x ∈ P = Zκp is E(x, κp) = (κp + 1)
xrκp modκ2p, where r
is randomly selected with uniform probability from Z∗κp :=
{x ∈ Zκp | gcd(x, κp) = 1}. Finally, to decrypt any ciphertext
c ∈ C = Zκ2p , D(c, κp, κs) = (L(c
λmodκ2p)µ)mod κp,
where L(z) = (z − 1)/κp.
Proposition 1 [3] 1) For r, r′ ∈ Z∗κp and t, t
′ ∈ P such that
t + t′ ∈ P, E(t, κp)E(t
′, κp)modκ
2
p = E(t + t
′, κp); 2) For
r ∈ Z∗κp and t, t
′ ∈ P such that tt′ ∈ P, E(t, κp)
t′ modκ2p =
E(t′t, κp).
Proposition 1 shows that the Paillier’s encryption is a semi-
homomorphic encryption scheme, i.e., algebraic manipulation
of the plain data is possible without decryption using appropri-
3A function f : N → R≥0 is called negligible if, for any c ∈ N, there
exists nc ∈ N such that f(n) ≤ 1/nc for all n ≥ nc.
3ate operations over the encrypted data. The Paillier’s encryp-
tion is additively homomorphic with operator ⊕ being defined
as x1⊕ x2 = (x1x2)modκ
2
p for all x1, x2 ∈ C. Note that the
Paillier’s method is not multiplicatively homomorphic as t′ in
the identity E(t, κp)
t′ modκ2p = E(t
′t, κp) in Proposition 1 is
not encrypted. Define △ such that x1△x2 = x
x2
1 modN
2 for
all x1 ∈ C and x2 ∈ P. Note that △ is not an operator (in the
mathematical sense) as its operands belong to two difference
sets; it is just a mapping.
III. DYNAMIC CONTROLLER IMPLEMENTATION
Consider the discrete-time linear time invariant system
P :
{
x[k + 1] = Ax[k] +Bu[k], x[0] = x0,
y[k] = Cx[k],
(1)
with k ∈ N, state x[k] ∈ Rnx , control input u[k] ∈ Rnu ,
and output y[k] ∈ Rny . Many linear time-invariant systems
cannot be stabilized by static output feedback controllers [23]–
[25]. Therefore, dynamic output feedback controllers have
been used for decades to stabilize system using only output
measurements, e.g., standard Kalman-filter (or Luenberger
observer) based linear regulators [26], and general dynamic
output feedback controllers for quadratic performance [27].
System (1) is controlled by a dynamic output feedback con-
troller of the form
C:


xc[k + 1]=
{
Acxc[k] +Bcy[k], (k+1)modT 6=0,
0, (k+1)modT=0,
u[k]=Ccxc[k] +Dcy[k],
(2)
with controller state xc[k] ∈ R
nc . It is assumed that the state
of the controller resets every T time steps, i.e., xc[ℓT ] = 0
for all ℓ ∈ N. This is because implementing encrypted con-
trollers over an infinite horizon is impossible due to memory
issues (by multiplication of fractional numbers, the number
of bits required for representing fractional and integer parts
grow). Combining the dynamics in (1) and (2) results in the
augmented system:
z[k + 1]=


F (P , C)z[k], (k+1)modT 6=0,[
I 0
0 0
]
F (P , C)z[k], (k+1)modT =0,
(3)
where z[k] :=
[
x[k]⊤ xc[k]
⊤
]⊤
and
F (P , C) :=
[
A+BDcC BCc
BcC Ac
]
. (4)
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for the
asymptotic stability of the origin of (1) in feedback with the
resetting controller (2).
Theorem 1 The closed-loop dynamics (1)-(2) is globally
asymptotically stable if there exist P ∈ R(nc+nx)×(nc+nx),
ε ∈ (0, 1), µ ∈ [−1, 0), δ ∈ [1,∞), and ǫ ∈ (0,∞) satisfying:
P ≻ ǫI, (5a)
F (P , C)⊤PF (P , C)  (1 + µ)P, (5b)
F (P , C)⊤
[
I 0
0 0
]
P
[
I 0
0 0
]
F (P , C)  δP, (5c)
δ(1 + µ)T−1 < ε. (5d)
Proof: See Appendix A.
The following result provides a sufficient condition for the
stabilizability of the system using the resetting controller.
Proposition 2 If nc ≥ nx, (A,B) is stabilizable, and (A,C)
is detectable, there exist µ = µ∗ ∈ [−1, 0) and ǫ = ǫ∗ ∈
(0,∞) such that (5a) and (5b) are satisfied.
Proof: See Appendix B.
For µ∗ ∈ [−1, 0) and ǫ∗ ∈ (0,∞) in Proposition 2, the
following problem can be solved to find the smallest resetting
horizon T for the dynamical controller:
min
T∈N
min
ε ∈ (0, 1)
δ ∈ [1,∞)
T, (6a)
s.t. P ≻ ǫ∗I, δ(1 + µ∗)T−1 < ε, (6b)
F (P , C)⊤PF (P , C)(1 + µ∗)P, (6c)
F (P , C)⊤
[
I 0
0 0
]
P
[
I 0
0 0
]
F (P , C) δP. (6d)
Note that the conditions in Theorem 1, or optimization prob-
lem (6), are sufficient but not necessary. This is always the case
when working with Lyapunov-based techniques for stability
of dynamical systems [27], [28]. In the next subsection, we
provide change of variables to cast these conditions as linear
matrix inequalities that can be solved off-line only once and
passed to the cloud for real-time control.
A. Synthesis of Resetting Controllers
In this subsection, we use appropriate change of variables to
linearize the matrix inequalities in Theorem 1 without gener-
ating conservatism. We provide tools for designing full order
(nc = nx) resetting controllers of the form (2) satisfying (5).
That is, we look for matrices (Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) satisfying the
inequalities in (5) for some positive definite P ∈ R2nx×2nx ,
µ ∈ [−1, 0), δ ∈ (0,∞), ε ∈ (0, 1), and T ∈ N. Let nc = nx
and P be positive definite. Consider F (P , C) in (4) and define:
F˜ (P , C) :=
[
I 0
0 0
]
F (P , C) =
[
A+BDcC BCc
0 0
]
. (7)
For simplicity of notation, in this subsection, F (P , C) and
F˜ (P , C) are denoted by F and F˜ , respectively. Then, (5b)
and (5c) can be written as
F⊤PF − (1 + µ)P  0, F˜⊤PF˜ − δP  0, (8)
where 0 denotes the zero matrix of appropriate dimensions.
Using properties of the Schur complement, inequalities (8)
are fulfilled if and only if the following is satisfied:
L :=
[
(1 + µ)P F⊤P
PF P
]
 0, L˜ :=
[
δP F˜⊤P
PF˜ P
]
 0. (9)
Note that the blocks PF and PF˜ are nonlinear functions of
(P,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc). In what follows, we propose a change
of variables: (P,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) → ν, so that, in the new
variables ν, we can obtain affine matrix inequalities equivalent
to (9). In particular, for positive definite P and nonlinear
matrix inequalities L ≥ 0 and L˜ ≥ 0, we aim at finding two
invertible matrices Y and T , and variables ν such that the
congruence transformations P → Y⊤PY , L → T ⊤LT , and
L˜ → T ⊤L˜T lead to new Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs)
4Y⊤PY > 0, T ⊤LT ≥ 0, and T ⊤L˜T ≥ 0 in the variables ν.
Let P be positive definite and partitioned as follows:
P :=
[
X U
U⊤ X˜
]
, (10)
with X,U, X˜ ∈ Rnx×nx and positive definite X, X˜ . Define
P−1 =:
[
Y V
V ⊤ Y˜
]
, Y :=
[
Y I
V ⊤ 0
]
, Z :=
[
I 0
X U
]
. (11)
Using block matrix inversion formulas, it can be verified that
Y X+V U⊤ = I and Y U+V X˜ = 0, which yields Y⊤P = Z .
Then, P → Y⊤PY takes the form:
Y⊤PY = ZY =
[
Y I
I X
]
=: P(ν). (12)
Define T := diag[Y,Y] with Y as introduced in (11). Then,
the transformations L → T ⊤LT and L˜ → T ⊤L˜T can be
written as
T ⊤LT =
[
(1 + µ)P(ν) Y⊤F⊤Z⊤
ZFY P(ν)
]
, (13)
T ⊤L˜T =
[
δP(ν) Y⊤F˜⊤Z⊤
ZF˜Y P(ν)
]
. (14)
Using the structure of F and F˜ and the change of variables:(
K1 −XAY K2
K3 K4
)
:=
(
U XB
0 Inu
)(
Ac Bc
Cc Dc
)(
V ⊤ 0
CY Iny
)
, (15)
the blocks ZFY and ZF˜Y can be written as
ZFY =
[
AY +BK3 A+BK4C
K1 XA+K2C
]
=: F(ν), (16)
ZF˜Y =
[
AY +BK3 A+BK4C
XBK3 +XAY XA+XBK4C
]
=: F˜(ν).
(17)
Therefore, under T and the change of variables in (15), we
can write T ⊤LT and T ⊤L˜T as follows:
T ⊤LT =
[
(1 + µ)P(ν) F(ν)⊤
F(ν) P(ν)
]
=: L(ν), (18)
T ⊤L˜T =
[
δP(ν) F˜(ν)⊤
F˜(ν) P(ν)
]
=: S(ν), (19)
with P(ν),F(ν), and F˜(ν) as defined in (12), (16), and
(17), respectively. Therefore, the original matrix inequality,
L  0 defined in (9), that depends non-linearly on the
decision variables (P,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) is transformed into a
new inequality, L(ν)  0, that is an affine function of the
variables ν. Note, however, that S(ν)  0 (the block F˜(ν)) is
still nonlinear in the new variables ν. In the following lemma,
we give a sufficient condition, in terms of an affine inequality
L˜(ν)  0, for S(ν) to be positive semidefinite.
Lemma 1 Consider P(ν) and S(ν) defined in (12) and (19),
respectively. Define the matrices:
R(ν) :=
(
AY +BK3 A+BK4C
)
, (20)
L˜(ν) :=
[
δP(ν) R(ν)⊤
R(ν) 2In −X
]
. (21)
Then, L˜(ν)  0⇒ S(ν)  0.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Lemma 1 provides a sufficient condition, L˜(ν)  0, for the
nonlinear matrix S(ν) to be positive semidefinite. This L˜(ν) is
an affine function of ν. Note, however, that finding ν satisfying
(P(ν) ≻ 0, L(ν)  0, L˜(ν)  0) might not be sufficient
to guarantee the existence of (P,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) satisfying
(P ≻ 0, L  0, L˜  0). For this to be true, matrices Y and T
must be invertible so that the transformations P → Y⊤PY =
P(ν), L → T ⊤LT = L(ν), and L˜ → T ⊤L˜T = S(ν) are
congruence transformations; and ν must render the change of
variables in (15) invertible.
Lemma 2 Consider matrices Y and P(ν) defined in (11) and
(12), respectively. Let (X,Y ) be such that P(ν) ≻ 0. Then,
Y and T = diag(Y,Y) are nonsingular and the change of
variables in (15) is invertible.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Therefore, by Lemma 2, if P(ν) ≻ 0, the transformations
P → P(ν), L → L(ν), and L˜ → S(ν) are congruence
transformations. The latter and the fact that (by Lemma 1)
L˜(ν) 0⇒ S(ν) 0 imply that

(P(ν)≻ 0, L(ν) 0, and L˜(ν) 0)
⇓
(P ≻ 0, L 0, and L˜ 0),
(22)
for P = Y−⊤P(ν)Y−1 and the controller matrices in (43)
obtained by inverting (15). In the following lemma, we sum-
marize the discussion presented above.
Lemma 3 For given system matrices (A,B,C). If there ex-
ist matrices ν = (X,Y,K1,K2,K3,K4), K2 ∈ R
nx×nu ,
K3 ∈ R
ny×nx , K4 ∈ R
nu×ny , X,Y,K1 ∈ R
nx×nx satisfying
P(ν)≻ 0, L(ν) 0, and L˜(ν) 0 with P(ν), L(ν), and L˜(ν)
as defined in (12), (18), and (21), respectively; then, there exist
(P,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) satisfying P ≻ 0, L 0, and L˜ 0 with P ,
L, and L˜ as defined in (9) and (10), respectively. Moreover,
for every ν such that P(ν)≻ 0, L(ν) 0, and L˜(ν) 0, the
change of variables in (15) and matrix Y in (11) are invertible
and the (P,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) obtained by inverting (12) and
(15) are unique and satisfy the analysis inequalities (8).
Proof: See Appendix E.
By Lemma 3, the matrices (P,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) obtained
by inverting (12) and (15) satisfy inequalities (8) (and thus
also (5b) and (5c)). Moreover, because the reconstructed P is
positive definite, inequality (5a) is satisfied with ǫ = λmin(P ),
where λmin(P ) ∈ R>0 denotes the smallest eigenvalue of P .
Next, we give the synthesis result corresponding to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 For given system matrices (A,B,C) and con-
stants ε ∈ (0, 1), µ ∈ [−1, 0), δ ∈ [1,∞), and T ∈ N satis-
fying (5d), if there exist matrices ν = (X,Y,K1,K2,K3,K4)
satisfying P(ν)≻ 0, L(ν) 0, and L˜(ν) 0; then, P =
Y−⊤P(ν)Y and the controller matrices in (43) satisfy the
analysis inequalities (5a)-(5c) and thus render the closed-loop
dynamics (1)-(2) asymptotically stable.
Proof: See Appendix F.
Controller Reconstruction. For given ν satisfying the syn-
thesis inequalities (P(ν)≻ 0,L(ν) 0, L˜(ν) 0):
1) For given X and Y , compute via singular value decom-
position a full rank factorization V U⊤ = I − Y X with
square and nonsingular V and U .
52) For given ν and invertible V and U , solve the system
of equations Y⊤PT = P(ν) and (15) to obtain the
matrices (P,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc).
Remark 1 Note that ε, µ, δ, and T , in Theorem 2 must be
fixed before looking for feasible solutions ν satisfying the
synthesis LMIs: P(ν)≻ 0, L(ν) 0, and L˜(ν) 0. However,
for any µ ∈ [−1, 0) and δ ∈ [1,∞), there always exist
ε ∈ (0, 1) and T ∈ N satisfying (5d). Moreover, the synthesis
LMIs depend on ν, δ, and µ but not on ε and T . Therefore,
to find feasible controllers, we only have to fix (µ, δ) and
look for ν satisfying the synthesis LMIs. The constants (µ, δ)
are, in fact, variables of the synthesis problem; however, to
linearize some of the constraints, we fix their value and search
over µ ∈ [−1, 0) and δ ∈ [1,∞) to find feasible ν. The
latter increases the computations needed to find controllers;
however, we can perform a bisection search over δ ∈ [1,∞)
and, because µ ∈ [−1, 0) (a bounded set), a grid search over
µ to decrease the required computations.
Finally, note that the characteristics (e.g., unstable poles)
of the system in (1) make the feasibility of the design
LMIs P(ν)≻ 0, L(ν) 0, and L˜(ν) 0 “easier or harder”
for fixed resetting horizon T and constants ε, µ, δ. Exploring
this dependence, in general, is an avenue for future research.
B. Dynamic Controller Implementation
In this subsection, we present the necessary transformations
required for implementing encrypted dynamic control laws.
Before stating the next result, we introduce some notation.
Define ‖A‖max := maxi,j |aij |, where aij denotes the entry
in i-th row and j-th column of matrix A, and Q(n,m) :=
{b | b = −bn2
n−m−1 +
∑n−1
i=1 2
i−m−1bi, bi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , n}}. For any x ∈ Rq and A ⊆ Rq , let proj(x,A) ∈
argminx′∈A ‖x
′ − x‖∞ and dist(x,A) := minx′∈A ‖x
′ −
x‖∞. The quantization of x ∈ R
q is proj(x,Q(n,m)q)
and the quantization error is ‖ proj(x,Q(n,m)q) − x‖∞ =
dist(x,Q(n,m)q). The quantization of X ∈ Rp×q is defined
as proj(x,Q(n,m)p×q) ∈ argminx′∈A ‖x
′ − x‖max and the
quantization error as ‖ proj(x,Q(n,m)p×q) − x‖max. Please
refer to [6] for details about the quantization scheme.
Theorem 3 Let
A¯c = proj(Ac,Q(n,m)
nc×nc), (23a)
B¯c = proj(Bc,Q(n,m)
nc×ny ), (23b)
C¯c = proj(Cc,Q(n,m)
nu×nx), (23c)
D¯c = proj(Dc,Q(n,m)
nu×ny ). (23d)
Then, there exists n¯ ≥ m¯ > 0 such that F (P , C) satisfies (5) if
and only if F (P , C¯), where C¯ denotes the controller in (2) with
quantized parameters A¯c, B¯c, C¯c, and D¯c in (23), satisfies (5)
with the same P for all n ≥ n¯ and m ≥ m¯.
Proof: The proof follows from continuity of the eigenval-
ues. Note that, by increasing n and m, the quantization error
decreases (actually, it tends to zero).
In what follows, we discuss the implementation of quantized
resetting controllers using homomorphic encryption schemes
and quantized sensor measurements. The controller, in this
case, is given by
C¯:


xc[k + 1]=
{
A¯cxc[k]+B¯cy¯[k], (k+1)modT 6=0,
0, (k+1)modT=0,
u[k]=C¯cxc[k] + D¯cy¯[k],
(24)
where A¯c, B¯c, C¯c, and D¯c are defined in (23) and
y¯[k] ∈ argmin
y∈Q(n,m)ny
‖y − y[k]‖∞. (25)
The difference between C¯ in (24) and C¯ in Theorem 3 is the
quantization of the output measurements y[k]. The following
standing assumption is made in this paper to ensure the
stability of the closed-loop system.
Assumption 1 n ≥ n¯ and m ≥ m¯ where n¯ and m¯ are given
in Theorem 3.
The following theorem proves the stability of the system P
with the quantized resetting controller C¯. Note that, for any
r ∈ R≥0, B(r) := {x | ‖x‖
2
2 ≤ r}.
Theorem 4 Under Assumption 1, if there exist ε ∈ (0, 1),
µ ∈ [−1, 0), δ ∈ [1,∞), T ∈ N, and ǫ ∈ (0,∞) such that
inequalities in (5) are satisfied and
n > log2
(
λmax(C
⊤C)
ǫ
x⊤0
[
I 0
0 0
]
P
[
I 0
0 0
]
x0
)
+ 1;
(26)
then, the system dynamics (1) with the quantized resetting
controller in (24) is stable and, for some constant4 ̺ > 0,
limk→∞ dist(x[k],B(̺2
−m)) = 0.
Proof: See Appendix G
Theorem 4 implies that the state of the system converges
to a vicinity of the origin (instead of the origin itself) due
to quantization effects. The volume of the this area can be
arbitrarily reduced by increasing m and thus the performance
of the system can be arbitrarily improved.
Lemma 4 For the resetting quantized controller in (24),
xc[k] ∈ Q((nc + 1)(kmodT − 1) + ny + n(kmodT +
1),m(kmodT + 1))nc and uc[k] ∈ Q((nc + 1)(kmodT ) +
ny + n(kmodT + 2),m(kmodT + 2))
nu .
Proof: See Appendix H.
Using the change of variables:
A˜c = (2
mA¯c)mod 2
n˜, (27a)
B˜c[k] = (2
m(kmodT+1)B¯c)mod 2
n˜, (27b)
C˜c = (2
mC¯c)mod 2
n˜, (27c)
D˜c[k] = (2
m(kmodT+1)D¯c)mod 2
n˜, (27d)
x˜c[k] = (2
m(kmodT+1)x¯c[k])mod 2
n˜, (27e)
y˜[k] = (2m(kmodT+1)y¯[k])mod 2n˜, (27f)
u˜[k] = (2m(kmodT+2)u¯[k])mod 2n˜, (27g)
with n˜ > (nc +1)T + nu + n(T + 2), the resetting quantized
4See Appendix G for a description of this constant.
6Fig. 1. Norm of the state of the closed-loop system ‖x[k]‖2 with quantized
controller (24) and quantizer resolution (n,m) = (24, 14).
Fig. 2. Norm of the state of the quantized controller ‖xc[k]‖2 in (24) with
quantizer resolution (n,m) = (24, 14).
controller in (24) can be rewritten as
C˜:


x˜c[k + 1]=
{
A˜cx˜c[k]+B˜c[k]y˜[k], (k+1)modT 6=0,
0, (k+1)modT=0,
u˜[k]=C˜cx˜c[k] + D˜c[k]y˜[k].
(28)
Note that, by Lemma 4, A˜c, B˜c, C˜c, D˜c, x˜c, y˜, u˜ are positive
integers. This is useful because the Paillier’s scheme can only
work with finite ring of positive integers. Therefore, the update
equation can now be implemented using Paillier’s encryption
scheme. The correctness of this implementation follows from
the results of [6] on fixed-point rational numbers.
First, the public and private keys must be generated such that
κp ≥ 2
n˜+1 to ensure that no unintended overflow occurs when
using the encrypted numbers. The sensors measure, quantize,
and encrypt the output to obtain
yˇi[k] := E(y˜i[k], κp). (29)
The controller follows the encrypted version of (28) to update
its state and compute the actuation signal as
(xˇc)i[k + 1] =


(
⊕nxj=1 (xˇc)j [k]△(A˜c)ij
)
⊕
(
⊕
ny
j=1 yˇj [k]△(B˜c)ij
)
,
(k + 1)modT 6= 0,
E(0, κp), (k + 1)modT = 0,
(30)
uˇi[k] =
(
⊕ncj=1 (xˇc)j [k]△(C˜c)ij
)
⊕
(
⊕
ny
j=1 (yˇ)j [k]△(D˜c)ij
)
. (31)
Fig. 3. Norm of the state of the closed-loop system ‖x[k]‖2 with quantized
controller (35) and quantizer resolution (n,m) = (24, 14).
Fig. 4. Norm of the state of the quantized controller ‖xc[k]‖2 in (35) with
quantizer resolution (n,m) = (24, 14).
Finally, the actuator extract the control signal by
u˜i[k] = D(uˇi[k], κp, κs)mod 2
n˜, and implements
ui[k] = 2
−m(kmodT+2)(u˜i[k]− 2
n˜
1u˜i[k]≥2n˜−1).
Remark 2 National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) recommends the use of key length of 2048 bits
for factoring-based asymmetric encryption to guarantee that
brute-force attacks are not physically possible during the
life-time of the services based on projections of computing
technologies. This high standard might not be necessary for
some applications, such as remote control of autonomous
vehicles. To demonstrate this, consider RSA, which is a sim-
ilar encryption methodology and also a semi-homomorphic
encryption relying on hardness of prime number factorization.
RSA encryption has been attacked repeatedly using a brute-
force methodology; see RSA Challenge5. Factorization of 663
bit numbers has been shown to take approximately 55 CPU-
Years6 [29]. Using IBM Watson (used recently for natural
language processing to win quiz show Jeopardy), factorization
of 663 bit numbers takes approximately 2.5 years. These
numbers are certainly not safe for use in finance or military.
However, for remote control of autonomous vehicles, these keys
may provide strong-enough guarantees as, by the time that an
adversary breaks the code, the autonomous vehicle is in an
entirely different location.
IV. CASE STUDY OF A CHEMICAL BATCH REACTOR
We illustrate the performance of our results through a
case study of a batch chemical reactor. This case study has
5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA Factoring Challenge
6A CPU-Year is the amuont of computing work done by a 1 Giga Floating
Point Operations Per Second (FLOP) reference machine in a year of dedicated
service (8760 hours).
7been developed over the years as a benchmark example for
networked control systems, see, e.g., [30]–[32]. The reactor
considered here is open-loop unstable, has one input, and
two outputs (please refer to [30]–[32] for details about the
system dynamics). We exactly discretize the reactor dynamics
introduced in [31] with sampling period h = 0.1. The resulting
discrete-time linear system is of the form (1) with matrices
A,B,C as follows:[
A B C⊤
]
=


1.18 0 0.51 −0.40 0 1 0
−0.05 0.66 −0.01 0.06 0.47 0 1
0.08 0.34 0.56 0.38 0.21 1 0
0 0.34 0.09 0.85 0.21 −1 0

. (32)
Note that eig[A] = {1.22, 1.01, .60, .42}; thus the system is
open-loop unstable. Moreover, it can be verified (e.g., using
the tools in [25, Theorem 3.3]) that there does not exist a
static output feedback controllers of the form u[k] = Ly[k],
L ∈ R1×2, stabilizing system (1) with matrices (A,B,C) as
in (32). First, using the synthesis results in Section III, we
design switching dynamic output feedback controllers of the
form (2). Using Theorem 2, and conducting a bisection in
δ ∈ [1,∞), and a line search in µ ∈ [−1, 0), we look for the
smallest δ for which there exist µ ∈ [−1, 0) and ν satisfying
the synthesis LMIs in Theorem 2. The obtained δ is given by
δ = δ∗ = 55.0, the corresponding µ is µ = µ∗ = −0.15, the
resetting horizon is T ∗ = argminT∈N δ
∗(1 + µ∗)T = 25, and
the reconstructed Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc (see Section III) are given in[
Ac Bc
Cc Dc
]
=


0.26 −0.03 −0.29 0.31 −0.52 −0.03
−0.32 1.24 1.40 −3.05 5.46 1.25
−0.45 0.02 0.87 −0.75 2.32 −0.01
−0.05 −0.04 0.72 −0.51 2.28 −0.08
1.02 −2.65 −2.65 6.28 −11.3 −4.09

. (33)
This controller satisfies the original inequalities in (5) with
ǫ = 0.0026 and any ε ∈ (0.9459, 1). For comparison, let
µ = µ∗ = −0.65 and search for the smallest δ for which
there exists ν satisfying the synthesis LMIs in Theorem 2. In
this case, δ∗ = 3000, the smallest resetting horizon is T ∗ =
argminT∈N δ
∗(1+µ∗)T = 8, the reconstructed Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc
are in[
Ac Bc
Cc Dc
]
=


−0.18 −0.01 −0.77 0.84 −1.11 −0.01
9.17 0.43 13.4 −16.2 22.8 0.42
1.24 0.10 3.82 −4.22 7.81 0.06
1.32 0.10 3.47 −3.87 7.89 0.06
−19.6 −0.93 −28.8 34.9 −49.0 −2.33

. (34)
This controller satisfies the original inequalities in (5) with
ǫ = 2.8× 10−5, and ε ∈ (0.6756, 1).
Next, we quantize the controller matrices according to (23)
to obtain (A¯c, B¯c, C¯c, D¯c) with quantizer resolution (n,m) =
(24, 14). It can be verified that for Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc in (33) and
(34), the corresponding A¯c, B¯c, C¯c, D¯c satisfy the conditions
of Theorem 4 with (n,m) = (24, 14). We quantize sensor
measurements y[k] according to (25) with the same resolution
(n,m) = (24, 14), and close the system dynamics with the
quantized controller in (24). By Theorem 4, the quantizer
resolution must satisfy inequality (26) to ensure practical
stability of (1) in feedback with (24) in the sense of Theo-
rem 4. Inequality (26), with initial condition [x(0)T , xc(0)
T ] =
[−6.83,−5.18,−4.05,−3.12, 0, 0, 0, 0], amounts to n > 17
for the controller in (33) and to n > 23 for the controller
in (34). Therefore, (n,m) = (24, 14) is enough for practical
stabilization using the controllers in (33) and (34). Figures 1
and 2 show ‖x(k)‖2 and ‖xc(k)‖2 of the closed-loop dynam-
ics for quantized controllers corresponding to the controllers
in (33) and (34) with (n,m) = (24, 14).
To illustrate the need for the proposed resetting controller,
we naively implement a standard quantized dynamic controller
of the form: {
x¯c[k + 1] = A¯cx¯c[k] + B¯cy¯[k],
u¯[k] = C¯cx¯c[k] + D¯cy¯[k].
(35)
We use the same quantizer resolution (n,m) = (24, 14),
and compute the matrices (A¯c, B¯c, C¯c, D¯c) using (23) with
(Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) from (34). This controller is stabilizing
even without resets. Note that the Paillier’s encryption only
works over the ring of positive integers Zκp , and thus the
controller needs to be transformed so that its states and
parameters always belong to this ring. Therefore, as also
required for the resetting controller, we must transform y¯[k]
and (A¯c, B¯c, C¯c, D¯c) into positive integers, which can be done
using the change of variables in (27) replacing kmodT with
k (as there is no resetting after T steps in this case). Let
the integer representations of y¯[k] and (A¯c, B¯c, C¯c, D¯c) be
similarly denoted by y˜[k] and (A˜c, B˜c, C˜c, D˜c). The equivalent
controller in the integer domain is then given by{
x˜c[k + 1] =
(
A˜cx˜c[k] + B˜cy˜[k]
)
mod 2n˜,
u˜[k] =
(
C˜cx˜c[k] + D˜cy˜[k]
)
mod 2n˜.
(36)
Finally, given u˜[k], the actuators implement the control action:
ui[k] = 2
−m(k+2)(u˜i[k]− 2
n˜
1u˜i[k]≥2n˜−1). (37)
Because we must ensure that 2n˜ ≤ κp, we need to select a
large, yet finite n˜. Here, for illustration purposes, we selected a
key length of 2048 bits and n˜ = 2014. Figure 3 and 4 illustrate
the norm of the state of the closed-loop system, ‖x[k]‖2,
with controller (34)-(37), and the state of the controller in
the quantized domain, ‖xc[k]‖, respectively. Note that, even
though (34)-(35) is a stabilizing controller (if no under/over
flow occur), when implementing (34)-(37), the closed-loop
system is unstable due to under/over flows.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A secure and private implementation of linear time-invariant
dynamic controllers using the Paillier’s encryption was pre-
sented. The state is reset to zero periodically to avoid data
overflow or underflow within the encryption space. A control
design approach was presented to ensure the stability and per-
formance of the closed-loop system with encrypted controller.
8Future work can focus on nonlinear dynamical systems and
controllers.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For the sake brevity F (P , C) is denoted by F . Consider the
quadratic Lyapunov function V (z[k]) = z[k]⊤Pz[k], where P
is a positive semi-definite matrix. For all k ∈ {ℓT, . . . , (ℓ +
1)T − 2} with ℓ ∈ N the Lyapunov function evolves as
V (z[k + 1])− V (z[k]) = z[k]⊤(F⊤PF − P )z[k]
≤ µz[k]⊤Pz[k]
= µV (z[k]). (38)
Therefore,
V (z[(ℓ+ 1)T − 1]) ≤ (1 + µ)T−1V (z[ℓT ]). (39)
Now, note that
V (z[(ℓ+ 1)T ]) =
[
x[(ℓ + 1)T ]
0
]⊤
P
[
x[(ℓ + 1)T ]
0
]
= z[(ℓ+ 1)T − 1]⊤F⊤
×
[
I 0
0 0
]
P
[
I 0
0 0
]
Fz[(ℓ+ 1)T − 1]
≤ δz[(ℓ+ 1)T − 1]⊤Pz[(ℓ+ 1)T − 1]
= δV (z[(ℓ+ 1)T − 1]). (40)
Combining (39) and (40) results in V (z[(ℓ + 1)T ]) ≤ δ(1 +
µ)T−1V (z[ℓT ]). This shows that limℓ→∞ V (z[ℓT ]) = 0.
Following (38), it can be seen that limk→∞ V (z[k]) = 0. This
proves the stability of the system.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We state the proof for two cases where nc = nx and
nc > nx. Case I (nc = nx): Since (A,B) is stabilizable
and (A,C) is detectable, a Luenberger observer exists such
that conditions (5a) and (5b) are satisfied. Case II (nc > nx):
Unobservable and uncontrollable states can be incorporated
into the controller in addition to the Luenberger observer so
that (5a) and (5b) are satisfied.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The block F˜(ν) can be factored as F˜(ν) =
P(ν)
(
0 In
)⊤
R(ν). Then, by properties of the Schur
complement, S(ν)  0 if and only if
δP(ν)− F˜(ν)⊤P(ν)−1F˜(ν) = δP(ν) −R(ν)⊤XR(ν)  0;
(41)
therefore, using the Schur complement again, S(ν)  0 if and
only if [
δP(ν) R(ν)⊤
R(ν) X−1
]
 0. (42)
Because (X−1/2 −X1/2)⊤(X−1/2 −X1/2)  0 for any X ,
we have that X−1  2In −X . It follows that[
δP(ν) R(ν)⊤
R(ν) X−1
]
 L˜(ν) =
[
δP(ν) R(ν)⊤
R(ν) 2In −X
]
;
therefore, L˜(ν)  0⇒ S(ν)  0.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let P(ν) be positive definite; then, by properties of the
Schur complement, Y ≻ 0 and X − Y −1≻ 0, and because
Y X + V U⊤ = I by construction (see (11)), V U⊤ = I −
Y X ≺ 0, i.e., the matrix V U⊤ is nonsingular. Therefore, if
P(ν)≻ 0, it is always possible to find nonsingular U and V
satisfying Y X+V U⊤ = I . The existence of a nonsingular V
implies that Y , introduced in (11), and T := diag[Y,Y] are
invertible. Moreover, nonsingular U and V imply that the
matrices: (
U XB
0 Inu
)
and
(
V ⊤ 0
CY Iny
)
,
are invertible. Therefore, the controller matrices:(
Ac Bc
Cc Dc
)
=
(
U XB
0 Inu
)−1(
K1 −XAY K2
K3 K4
)
(43)
×
(
V ⊤ 0
CY Iny
)−1
,
are the unique solution of the matrix equation (15).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Assume that ν is such that P(ν)≻ 0, L(ν) 0, and
L˜(ν) 0. Then, by Lemma 2, Y and T are square and non-
singular and thus the transformations P → Y⊤PY = P(ν),
L → T ⊤LT = L(ν), and L˜ → T ⊤L˜T = S(ν) are
congruent. By Lemma 1, L˜(ν) 0⇒ S(ν) 0. It follows that
(P(ν)≻ 0,L(ν) 0, L˜(ν) 0) implies (P ≻ 0,L 0, L˜ 0)
because (P(ν),L(ν),S(ν)) have the same signature as
(P,L, L˜), respectively, and L˜(ν) 0 ⇒ S(ν) 0. Because
P(ν)≻ 0, the matrices U and V are nonsingular. This implies
that the change of variables in (15) and T are invertible and
lead to unique (P,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) by inverting (12) and (15).
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
If ν satisfies P(ν)≻ 0, L(ν) 0, and L˜(ν) 0, by
Lemma 3, the change of variables in (15) and matrix Y in (11)
are invertible and the controller matrices (43) and P obtained
by inverting (12) and (15) are unique and satisfy inequalities
(5a)-(5c) with ǫ = λmin(P ). Hence, because (5d) is satisfied
by assumption, by Theorem 1, the controller matrices in (43)
render the closed-loop dynamics (1)-(2) asymptotically stable.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
For the sake of brevity F (P , C¯) is denoted by F¯ . First, note
that
z[ℓT + i] = F¯ iz[ℓT ] +
i−1∑
j=0
F¯ i−j−1GθℓT+j ,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, where θk:=y¯[k]− y[k] and
G =
[
A+BD¯c
B¯c
]
.
9For i = T , it can be seen that
z[ℓT + i] =
[
I 0
0 0
](
F¯ z[ℓT + i− 1] +GθℓT+i−1
)
.
Combining these update rules shows that
z[(ℓ+ 1)T ] = HF¯T z[ℓT ] + wℓ, (44)
where
H :=
[
I 0
0 0
]
, wℓ :=
T−1∑
j=0
[
I 0
0 0
]
F¯T−j−1GθℓT+j .
Note that
z[(ℓ+ 1)T ]⊤Pz[(ℓ+ 1)T ] =z[ℓT ]⊤F¯⊤TH⊤PHF¯T z[ℓT ]
+ 2w⊤ℓ PHF¯
T z[ℓT ] + w⊤ℓ Pwℓ
≤δz[ℓT ]⊤F¯⊤T−1PF¯T−1z[ℓT ]
+ 2w⊤ℓ PHF¯
T z[ℓT ] + w⊤ℓ Pwℓ
≤δ(1 + µ)T−1z[ℓT ]⊤Pz[ℓT ]
+ 2w⊤ℓ PHF¯
T z[ℓT ] + w⊤ℓ Pwℓ,
where the inequalities follow from F¯⊤H⊤PHF¯ ≤ δP and
F¯⊤PF¯ ≤ (1 + µ)P . Thus,
z[(ℓ+ 1)T ]⊤Pz[(ℓ+ 1)T ]− z[ℓT ]⊤Pz[ℓT ]
≤(δ(1 + µ)T−1 − 1)z[ℓT ]⊤Pz[ℓT ]
+ 2w⊤ℓ PHF¯
T z[ℓT ] + w⊤ℓ Pwℓ
≤(δ(1 + µ)T−1 − 1)‖P 1/2z[ℓT ]‖22
+ 2‖P−1/2F¯⊤TH⊤P‖2W‖P
1/2z[ℓT ]‖2
+ λmax(P )W
2,
where
W := sup
ℓ
‖wℓ‖2
=sup
ℓ
∥∥∥∥
T−1∑
j=0
[
I 0
0 0
]
F¯T−j−1GθℓT+j
∥∥∥∥
2
≤
T−1∑
j=0
∥∥∥∥
[
I 0
0 0
]
F¯T−j−1GθℓT+j
∥∥∥∥
2
≤
T−1∑
j=0
‖F¯‖T−j−1‖G‖ sup
ℓ
‖θℓT+j‖2
≤
( T−1∑
j=0
‖F¯‖T−j−1‖G‖
)
ny2
−m,
where the last equality follows from that the quantization error
is bounded by ‖θℓT+j‖2 ≤ ny2
−m if n is selected large
enough, i.e., n is selected such that ‖y[k]‖∞ < 2
n−1 (see
the last paragraph of this proof for ensuring this). Let s1
denote the largest real root of the polynomial equation s 7→
[(δ(1+µ)T−1−1)λmax(P )]s
2+[2‖P−1/2F¯⊤TH⊤P‖2W ]s+
[λmax(P )W
2]. Define M1 := {z | z
⊤Pz ≤ s21}. Notice that if
z[ℓT ] /∈ M1, z[(ℓ+ 1)T ]
⊤Pz[(ℓ+ 1)T ]− z[ℓT ]⊤Pz[ℓT ] < 0
(and thus z[(ℓ + 1)T ] ∈ M1) since (δ(1 + µ)
T−1 − 1) < 0.
However, if z[ℓT ] ∈ M1, it can be deduce that z[(ℓ +
1)T ]⊤Pz[(ℓ+1)T ] ≤ s2 := δ(1 + µ)
T−1s21 + λmax(P )W
2 +
2‖P−1/2F¯⊤TH⊤P‖2Ws1. Define M2 := {z | z
⊤Pz ≤ s22}.
Evidently, if z[ℓT ] ∈ M1, then z[(ℓ+ 1)T ] ∈M2. Combining
these results, it can be seen that M1 ∪ M2 is an invariant
set for (44). This is because two distinct cases can happen if
z[ℓT ]∈M1 ∪ M2; either z[ℓT ] ∈ M2 \ M1 or z[ℓT ] ∈ M1
must happen. If z[ℓT ] ∈ M2 \M1, it means that z[ℓT ] /∈ M1,
thus z[(ℓ + 1)T ] ∈ M1 ⊆ M1 ∪ M2. On the other hand,
if z[ℓT ] ∈ M1, then z[(ℓ + 1)T ] ∈ M2 ⊆ M1 ∪ M2.
Furthermore, M1 ∪M2 is an invariant set for the dynamical
system in feedback loop with (24). This is because, for all
k ∈ {ℓT, . . . , (ℓ+1)T−2}, z[k+1]⊤Pz[k+1]−z[k]⊤Pz[k] =
V (z[k + 1]) − V (z[k]) ≤ µz[k]⊤Pz[k] < 0. It can be seen
that the set M1 ∪ M2 is attractive for (44). This because if
z[ℓT ] /∈ M1 ∪ M2, it must also z[ℓT ] /∈ M1. Therefore,
z[(ℓ + 1)T ]⊤Pz[(ℓ + 1)T ] − z[ℓT ]⊤Pz[ℓT ] < 0. All these
results in the fact that limk→∞ dist(z[k],M1 ∪ M2) = 0.
Now, note thatmax(s1, s2) = O(2
−m). Therefore, there exists
̺ > 0 such that limk→∞ dist(z[k],B(̺2
−m)) = 0.
It only remains to find the bound on n. Note that the largest
value of the Lyapunov function is
z[0]⊤Pz[0] = c := x⊤0
[
I 0
0 0
]
P
[
I 0
0 0
]
x0.
This implies that z[k]⊤Pz[k] ≤ c. Therefore, x[k]⊤x[k] +
xc[k]
⊤xc[k] = z[k]
⊤z[k] ≤ c/λmin(P ) := c/ǫ. As a result,
x[k]⊤x[k] ≤ c/ǫ. Noting that y[k] = Cx[k], it can be deduced
that y[k]⊤y[k] ≤ λmax(C
⊤C)c/ǫ. Finally, because of the
relationship between norms, it can be seen that ‖y[k]‖∞ ≤
λmax(C
⊤C)c/ǫ. This implies that 2n−1 > λmax(C
⊤C)c/ǫ
and thus n > log2(λmax(C
⊤C)c/ǫ) + 1.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Noting that the controller resets every T steps, we only
need to prove this result for k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. At k = 0,
xc[k] = 0 and thus xc[1] ∈ Q(ny+2n, 2m) because the entries
of B¯cy¯[k] belong to Q(ny+2n, 2m). For all k ∈ {1, . . . , T −
1}, if the entries of xc[k] belong to Q(n
′,m′), the entries of
A¯cxc[k] (at worst case) belong to Q(nc+n+n
′,m+m′) and
the entries of B¯cy¯[k] belong to Q(ny + 2n, 2m), therefore
the entries of x[k + 1] = A¯cxc[k] + B¯cy¯[k] must belong to
Q(nc + n + n
′ + 1,m +m′) because ny ≤ nc, n ≤ n
′, and
m ≤ m′. Furthermore, u[k] must belong to Q(nc + n+ n
′ +
1,m+m′). This proves that the entries of xc[k] and u[k] must,
respectively, belong to Q((nc + n+ 1)(kmodT − 1) + ny +
2n,m(kmodT − 1) + 2m) and Q((nc + n+ 1)(kmodT ) +
ny + 2n,m(kmodT ) + 2m).
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